
This week’s contribution is by Gülce Korkmaz, PhD student and Fellow at the Joachim Herz Doctoral School of Law at the Leuphana University of Lüneburg. She will walk us through the proposed amendments to the Turkish Competition Act, and shed some light on the heavily amended E-commerce Law. Her analysis reveals the content, progressive nature, and risks of Türkiye’s regulatory approach to digital platform markets.
By Gülce Korkmaz[1]
The impact of digital markets on competition authorities worldwide remains a persistent concern, and Turkish competition law is no exception. As the digital landscape evolves, competition authorities worldwide are tasked with striking the right balance – fostering innovation while safeguarding fair competition. In this blog post, I’ll explore how Turkish competition law addresses the challenges of digital markets. I’ll begin with a brief background on the path leading to the proposed amendments to the Turkish Competition Act (TCA), followed by an overview of these amendments, often referred to as the “Turkish DMA.”[2]
The Road to the Proposed Amendments
Over the past decade, the Turkish Competition Authority has grappled with violations by today’s gatekeepers, as defined by the EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA). Under the DMA, so far the designated gatekeepers are Apple, Alphabet, ByteDance, Microsoft and Meta, as well as e-commerce giants Amazon and Booking.com.[3] Local players in the Turkish market, including Trendyol, Yemek Sepeti, Sahibinden, Çiçek Sepeti, and Nadirkitap, have also come under scrutiny[4].
In 2022, Türkiye made significant changes to its merger approval process, particularly in the context of technology mergers. The Communiqué Concerning the Mergers and Acquisitions Calling for the Authorization of the Competition Board (Communiqué No. 2010/4) was amended. A new sub-article was introduced, exempting tech acquisitions from the usual approval thresholds. This recognizes the distinct nature of technology-driven deals and acknowledges that traditional thresholds may not fully capture their impact.
In October 2022, Türkiye proposed amendments to the TCA to better address the challenges of digital markets. These amendments are part of the country’s medium-term strategy. It is scheduled for parliamentary discussion in late 2024, and we expect it to be formally enacted by the end of this year. In 2023, the Competition Authority further adapted to the digital landscape by establishing a specialized unit focused on the digital economy and releasing a report titled “The Impact of Digital Transformation on Competition Law.”
The report highlighted the unique complexities of the digital landscape and underscored the need to recalibrate competition law to address the intersection of innovation, data-driven power, and consumer welfare. It also provided important insights into the Competition Authority’s approach to regulating digital markets. Fast forward to today, a revised version of the proposed amendments was circulated to certain parties for their feedback and input in June 2024. The proposed amendments, similar in structure to § 19a of the German Competition Act (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen – GWB), are set to introduce a new paragraph 6/A within Article 6, addressing the abuse of dominant positions. While the way the amendments are implemented are akin to § 19a GWB, the content of these amendments actually closely mirrors the Digital Markets Act (DMA). Below, I will walk you through the most important parts of the so-called “Turkish DMA”.

Purpose and Scope of the Act According to the Proposed Amendments
The proposed amendments would establish a new objective within the TCA: to establish and protect a fair and contestable market structure in core platform services. Notably, drawing inspiration from the DMA, this proposal leaves the scope of the fair and contestable market objective somewhat open-ended, in contrast to the DMA.
Gatekeeper Designation
The obligations laid down in Art. 6/A only apply to gatekeepers. Gatekeepers are designated if they operate on (i) a significant scale; (ii) in one or more core platform services; (iii) have significant impact over access to end users or the activities of commercial users; and (iv) possess the power to maintain this influence on an established basis. What exactly is a “significant scale”, or “significant impact” is yet to be defined in secondary legislation but will likely include some quantitative thresholds as well as aspects for a qualitative assessment.
The rationale behind establishing quantitative thresholds (such as revenue criteria) through secondary legislation may be attributed to Türkiye’s prevailing high inflation rates. This approach could allow more flexible threshold adjustments in response to economic fluctuations. However, it would be preferable to define the other criteria explicitly in a more transparent legal instrument, establishing a more precise legal framework.
Once a firm exceeds the thresholds, they must notify the Competition Authority within 30 days and include its objections to designation. The Authority will decide within 60 days whether the firm is designated and which obligations it will be subjected to. It may decide that some obligations do not apply, or that there are exemption grounds. This will be determined on a case-by-case basis, in an interesting departure from the DMA’s design.
After designation, gatekeepers can object to the imposed obligations within the specified compliance period. The effectiveness of this system is questionable. One of the objectives of the amendments is to ensure “speed” in the regulatory process. Whether the Competition Authority’s case-by-case determination of obligations will achieve this objective remains unclear. For both gatekeepers and challengers, a clear understanding of their obligations and prohibitions in advance is essential for the principle of legal certainty. This significant departure from the DMA’s approach may have an impact on the effectiveness of the regulatory framework.
The proposed amendments stipulate that the gatekeeper designation decision will be valid for three years. If no application is submitted within 90 days of the conclusion of this period, the designation will automatically renew for a further three years. This “automatic renewal” concept represents a notable regulatory mechanism not explicitly derived from the DMA. Given the rapidly evolving nature of digital markets, such an automatic renewal procedure deviates from the objectives of the proposed amendments.

Proposed Obligations and Prohibitions
The proposed Article 6/A introduces 13 new obligations and prohibitions, which can apply to the gatekeeper if the Competition Authority deems suitable. The obligations be grouped into seven main categories.
- A prohibition of self-preferencing (Art. 6/A(a) TCA)
- Obligations and prohibition related to data-use (Art. 6/A(b, g, h, i) TCA)
- Obligations and prohibitions for targeting, tying, and leveraging (Art. 6/A(c, d, e) TCA)
- Obligations and prohibitions related to exclusivity practices (Art. 6/A(f) TCA)
- Interoperability obligations (Art. 6/A(j) TCA)
- Obligations to address information asymmetry (Art. 6/A(k, l) TCA)
- Obligation to provide FRAND access to its services (Art. 6/A(m) TCA)
In many instances, the obligations parallel a selection of the obligations imposed in Art. 5 and 6 DMA. The greatest distinguishing feature is the ability of the Competition Authority to determine which obligations actually apply to a specific gatekeeper. Self-preferencing is similar to Art. 6(5) DMA. The obligations related to data practice concern using non-public data, combining personal data, granting access to data and ensuring data portability are generally parallel to Articles 5(2) and 6(2), (9), (10) DMA. Obligations related to tying and leveraging are largely in line with Articles 5(5), (7), (8) and 6(3) DMA. Prohibitions related to exclusivity are generally akin to the anti-steering obligations laid down in Art. 5(3) and (4) DMA. Interoperability mimics Art. 6(3) and (4) DMA. The clauses aimed at resolving the information asymmetry concerns through the obligations of providing information to end-users and business users including advertisers, publishers, and authorized third parties are generally parallel to those set forth in Art. 5(9), (10) DMA. The obligation to provide FRAND access for commercial users to intermediary services (including social network services) and search engines is also set forth in line with Art. 6(12) DMA. Data access related to search (Art. 6(11) DMA) is notably absent from the Turkish DMA.
Enforcement of Obligations and Fines
The 2024 version of the proposed amendments to the TCA lack an expedited, streamlined enforcement procedure for addressing potential violations of ex-ante prohibitions, a significant shortcoming in the proposed legislation. Unlike the 2022 version of the proposed amendments, which -unnecessarily- reiterated that the standard investigative procedures would be applied, the 2024 draft is silent on this procedure. This indicates that the legislators did not intend to create a separate process to address violations in digital markets. This is inconsistent with the draft’s rationale, which emphasizes the need for expedited responses to digital market dynamics.

The substantive sanctions available under the proposed amendments to the TCA are significant. The first fine can be up to 10% of the annual gross revenue of an undertaking, if the firm breaches its obligations under Art. 6/A twice in five years, this can go up to 20% of annual gross revenue. Furthermore, two breaches in five years allows the Competition Authority to impose structural remedies without prior behavioral measures or even prohibit the gatekeeper from engaging in M&A transactions for a period of up to three years. This approach — allowing for structural remedies such as breaking up a company after just two violations — could be seen as potentially overreaching. It is crucial to apply this provision judiciously to avoid unintended market disruptions and adverse effects on competition. A more nuanced framework, similar to the DMA’s approach of prioritizing behavioral remedies and specifying clear criteria for structural measures, might have provided a better balance. Failure to comply with the (technical/administrative) requirements for on-site inspections or providing incorrect information will result in an administrative fine of 0.1% of the annual gross turnover. Beside these fines, the gatekeeper might be subject to daily penalties for each day they fail to meet the requirements for on-site inspections (0.5% of their annual gross revenues per day).
While these provisions are designed to ensure compliance and deter violations, they may also have the unintended consequence of discouraging market participation and stifling innovation and competition. In particular, the daily fines for non-compliance with inspection requirements may create an undue financial burden on companies, requiring a careful balance between deterrence and fairness.
Concluding Insights
Amidst the proactive efforts of the Turkish Competition Authority, a significant development has taken place: in July 2022, significant amendments were made to the E-Commerce Law, which is overseen by the Turkish Ministry of Trade. The amended E-Commerce Law classifies e-commerce service providers and intermediary e-commerce platforms into four groups based on platform size, and imposes cumulatively increasing obligations and prohibitions on each group. To determine platform size, the E-Commerce Law uses only the “net transaction volume” criterion, which does not provide meaningful information on market power. Furthermore, the link between the established thresholds (determining the four size-based groups) and the corresponding obligations remains unclear.
The obligations and restrictions are unprecedented. E-commerce intermediary platforms and e-commerce service providers (with a net annual transaction volume of more than 15 billion Turkish Liras and more than 100.000 transactions) should obtain a licence from the Ministry of Trade that must be renewed every year in order to continue operating (Additional Article 4 of the Law). Moreover, all e-commerce intermediary platforms (regardless of their size) are not allowed to offer for sale or mediate the sale of goods bearing its own private label or the trademark rights of entities within its economic integrity [Additional Article 2/1(a)].
For the large-scale e-commerce intermediary platforms and e-commerce service providers (whose net trading volume in a calendar year is more than 45 billion Turkish Liras and the number of transactions is more than 100.000), specific limits are set for advertising and campaign/promotion expenses [Additional Art. 2/3(a)-(b) and 3/3]. The very large e-commerce intermediary platforms and e-commerce service providers (whose net trading volume in a whose net trading volume in a calendar year exceeds 90 billion Turkish Liras and the number of transactions exceeds 100.000) are (i) prohibited from cooperating with banks, financial leasing companies, factoring companies, financing companies and savings and loan associations with which they are economically integrated [Additional Art. 2/4(a)], (ii) is also prohibited from accepting electronic currencies issued by electronic money institutions with which it has economic integrity [Additional Art. 2/4(b)], (iii) may not engage in the activities of transport business organiser and postal service provider, except for sales in e-commerce marketplaces where it provides intermediation services, sales made by itself as an e-commerce service provider, and sales outside e-commerce [Additional Art. 2/4(c)].
These restrictions imposed could lead to significant efficiency losses and increased transaction costs. To annul these restrictions, the representatives of the main opposition party filed a petition with the Constitutional Court and challenged the amendments. Yet, Constitutional Court dismissed the lawsuit on July 2023[5].
These changes have profoundly impacted the regulatory landscape for e-commerce intermediary platforms and service providers, creating unprecedented burdens. Should the proposed amendments to the Turkish Competition Act be enacted, e-commerce businesses could be regulated under two distinct legal frameworks. This regulatory overlap is likely to increase compliance costs for e-commerce businesses, underscoring a challenge in achieving regulatory coherence and effectiveness.
As we evaluate the proposed amendments to Turkish competition law, it’s evident that there may have been significant benefits in drawing more deeply from global experiences before proceeding. Various jurisdictions have extensively examined and addressed the rapid evolution of digital markets and their complex challenges, notably through the EU’s Digital Markets Act. Integrating these international insights and best practices could have helped Türkiye develop a more robust and effective regulatory framework. By learning from the successes and pitfalls experienced by others, Türkiye might have forged a clearer path forward, achieving a more balanced approach that fosters innovation while ensuring fair competition in the digital economy. As the digital landscape continues to evolve, competition authorities, including Türkiye’s, face the ongoing challenge of harmonizing the need for fair competition with the demands of the digital age. Stay tuned as Türkiye embarks on this new chapter in its digital markets journey!
We thank Gülce for her contribution to the SCiDA Global Regulation Series. If you’d like to stay up to date on the series and our regular blogs, please subscribe to our newsletter.
[1] Ph.D. Student, Fellow of Joachim Herz Doctoral School of Law, Leuphana University of Lüneburg, Germany, guelce.korkmaz@stud.leuphana.de
[2] Turkish competition law has been shaped to a significant extent by EU competition law. The evolution of Turkish competition law has been influenced by Türkiye’s aspiration to align with EU standards; the Ankara Treaty and subsequent efforts to align with EU legislation have encouraged Türkiye to adopt competition laws similar in structure and content to those of the EU.
[3] Turkish Competition Authority’s Booking.com decision on 05.01.2017 with No. 17-01/12-4; Google Android decision on 19.09.2018 with No. 18-33/555-273; Google Shopping decision on 13.02.2020 with No. 20-10/119-69; Google Adwords decision 12.11.2020 with No. 20-49/675-295; Google Local Search decision on 08.04.2021 with No. 21-20/248-105; Meta Whatsapp decision on 20.10.2022 with No. 22-48/706-299
[4] Turkish Competition Authority’s Yemeksepeti decision on 09.06.2016 with No. 16-20/347-156; Sahibinden.com decision on 01.10.2018 with No. 18-36/584-285; Kitapyurdu.com decision 05.11.2020 with No. 20-48/658-289; Çiçeksepeti.com decision on 08.04.2021 with No. 21-20/250-106; Hepsiburada.com decision on 15.04.2021 with No. 21-22/266-116; Nadirkitap.com decision on 07.04.2022 with No. 22-15/273-122; Sahibinden.com decisions (i) on 30.09.2021 with no. 21-46/655-325 and (ii) on 13.07.2023 with no. 23-31/604-204; Dolap-Trendyol.com decision on 27.02.2023 with No. 23-11/17754 and Trendyol.com decision on 13.07.2023 with No. 23-31/604-204.
[5] The judgment of the Constitutional Court (E.2022/109, K.2023/125 of 13 July 2023) published in the Official Gazette on 22 September 2023 under number 32317.