The Digital Markets Act (DMA) gives the European Commission the central role in policing big tech gatekeepers. The Italian competition authority, the AGCM, however, shows that national authorities may be more than supporting actors. In June 2026, it became the first national competition authority to open a DMA investigation, examining whether Apple grants rival cloud services effective interoperability with iOS and iPadOS under Article 6(7) DMA. The case is part of a broader pattern. The AGCM has also targeted DMA-related conduct through other avenues, including consumer law proceedings against Google’s consent design and abuse of dominance proceedings against Meta’s integration of Meta AI into WhatsApp. Together, these cases show how national authorities can shape the DMA’s practical enforcement agenda, even though final non-compliance decisions remain with the Commission. The Italian example, therefore, points to a more layered enforcement model, with centralised decision-making taking place in Brussels, but decentralised investigation, agenda-setting and strategic pressure occurring at the national level.
By Alessia D’Amico
The Italian competition authority (AGCM) is no stranger to big tech enforcement. Over the past decade, the AGCM has repeatedly investigated some of the world’s largest digital platforms. Hence, it comes as no surprise that it was the first NCA to open a case under the DMA. It did so on the 16th June, when it announced an investigation into Apple over its compliance with the DMA interoperability obligation under Article 6(7). While this is its first DMA case, in the past it had already brought DMA-related cases, such as the one concerning Google in a matter relating to freely given consent. In light of the fact that the aim of the DMA is to harmonise the regulation of gatekeepers across the EU and centralise enforcement, it renews questions about the role of NCAs in the enforcement of the DMA.
The role of NCAs in the DMA
The Commission is exclusively competent to enforce the DMA. At the same time, national authorities are given a role in aiding its implementation and enforcement. A key provision is contained in Article 38(7) DMA, which allows NCAs to investigate breaches of Articles 5-7 DMA on their own territory, in order to support the Commission. Empowering NCAs to do so is presented as being particularly relevant in cases in which ‘it cannot be determined from the outset whether a gatekeeper’s behaviour is capable of infringing this Regulation, the competition rules which the national competent authority is empowered to enforce, or both’ (recital 91). Under Article 38(7) DMA, NCAs need to report findings on possible non-compliance by gatekeepers to the Commission, which may open proceedings to investigate the conduct. If the Commission decides to open proceedings regarding the matter, it relieves the NCA of such a possibility, as it is ultimately the sole enforcer of the DMA.
In order for NCAs to conduct an investigation into possible non-compliance, Article 38(7) DMA clearly states that they need to be given the competence and investigative powers under national law. Based on this provision, Article 18 of Law 214/2023 implemented the DMA in Italy and empowered the AGCM to exercise investigative powers for Article 38(7) DMA cases, using the same toolbox available in domestic competition law proceedings.
The Apple DMA interoperability investigation
In its recently opened investigation against Apple, the AGCM examines whether Apple complies with its interoperability obligations under Article 6(7) DMA. Under this provision, it must ensure that third-party providers of consumer cloud services are granted free and effective interoperability with iOS and iPadOS and are given access to hardware and software features under equal conditions as those available to Apple’s iCloud.
The AGCM takes issue with the apparent disadvantage of rival cloud providers vis-à-vis Apple’s cloud service. One concrete example is that end users are unable to use the iOS and iPadOS features to perform a full backup using an alternative cloud storage service. This is ostensibly primarily caused by Apple not allowing competitors to access the API needed to create such a backup. Another reported hurdle affecting third-party providers is the inability to process information seamlessly, without the need for active user interaction. As a result of the technical restrictions on iOS and iPadOS, denying competitors full interoperability, users are incentivised to use the iCloud service (including the paid version), without exploring alternatives. Thus, according to the AGCM, Apple’s conduct may fail to guarantee competitors the effective interoperability necessary to enable them to develop alternative cloud services aimed at end users. This hampers market contestability and prevents a diverse range of offerings from benefiting users.
DMA-related interventions by the AGCM
Other cases brought by the AGCM are also closely linked to the DMA and thus invite us to reflect on different dimensions of the role of NCAs in DMA enforcement.
Google’s linking of services
In July 2024, the AGCM’s launched an investigation into Google’s request for consent to linking user data across its services, issued pursuant to Article 5(2) DMA. What stands out in this case is that, while the practice concerns Google’s activities to comply with the DMA, the case was brought under Italian consumer law, with the AGCM deeming Google’s practices deceptive and aggressive. The deceptiveness, according to the AGCM, lies in Google’s consent request failing to provide consumers with sufficiently clear information about the nature and consequences of their consent and steering users away from granular consent choices. The aggressiveness, on the other hand, is caused by Google pressuring consumers to provide consent. In particular, users are prevented from accessing Google Search until they make a choice, and the negative consequences of refusing consent are overemphasised.
This case was closed in November 2025, with Google providing commitments. In its commitments proposal, Google starts off by claiming that the AGCM does not have the authority to intervene, under the Italian consumer code, in connection with Google’s consent request filed pursuant to Article 5(2) of the DMA. It contends that this matter falls within the exclusive competence of the Commission to enforce the DMA and that maintaining this division is vital in order to achieve the regulatory harmonisation foreseen by the DMA. The proper avenue available to the AGCM for conveying its assessments regarding the consent request is, according to Google, the cooperation mechanisms set forth in Articles 37 and 40 of the DMA. However, Google does go on making commitments to address the concerns raised by the AGCM. It essentially undertakes to provide more detailed and accurate information on the linking of personal data across its services. More concretely, Google commits to changing its consent request by providing clearer information on the implications of consent for the use of personal data, as well as on how users can limit their consent by choosing to grant it only for certain services.
Meta AI investigation
In July 2025, the AGCM opened proceedings against Meta, alleging that Meta AI’s integration into WhatsApp constituted an abuse of dominance under Article 102 TFEU. Meta AI is a chatbot that responds to general-purpose queries and offers forms of interaction similar to virtual assistants. In March 2025, Meta decided to pre-install Meta AI in its WhatsApp service, without any prior request from users. It also placed Meta AI in a prominent position on the screen and integrated it into the search bar. The AGCM’s concern is that through this integration, Meta is capable of extending its customer base into the emerging AI market, not through merit-based competition, but by imposing this tie on users, potentially harming competitors. According to the AGCM, there is a risk that users become locked-in or functionally dependent on Meta AI, because, by using the information provided by users, it appears that the responses generated by the service become increasingly useful.
The AGCM imposed interim measures on Meta to suspend certain terms that could hinder competing AI chatbot providers. In May 2026, it closed its proceedings, as the case was taken over by the Commission, which has, in the meantime, imposed interim measures on Meta, ordering it to restore free access to WhatsApp for rival general-purpose AI assistants.
Although formally pursued under Article 102 TFEU, the AGCM’s proceedings against Meta closely reflect concerns that are also central to the DMA. The case revolves around the allegation that Meta leverages its control over a core platform service to give its own AI assistant a built-in distribution advantage, potentially foreclosing competing chatbot providers. This raises issues such as tying, self-preferencing, and user lock-in, dynamics that the DMA seeks to address ex ante in order to prevent gatekeepers from extending dominance from core platform services into adjacent markets.
Significance for DMA enforcement
The DMA was designed to achieve maximum harmonisation in the regulation of gatekeepers, to avoid fragmentation in the internal market. The Commission is consequently the sole authority empowered to find infringements of the DMA and impose fines. However, looking at the Italian example, it appears that, as argued by Alba Ribera Martínez, “now that the DMA has been adopted and entered into force, this quasi-centralised system of enforcement is shifting again towards de facto decentralization”. An obvious reason for involving NCAs is that the Commission does not have the substantial resources needed to supervise all relevant conduct effectively. Moreover, many NCAs already possess expertise in digital markets, data-driven business models and issues such as interoperability, data access and data portability. Their involvement can therefore enhance enforcement through additional expertise and capacity. As explained by Inge Graef, national investigations may also generate valuable insights that inform enforcement at EU level and encourage gatekeepers to adopt changes beyond the member state concerned. While the significance of NCAs’ participation in DMA enforcement was clear from the outset, the AGCM’s recent activity illustrates how decentralisation is unfolding in practice.
The path taken in the Apple interoperability case, through Article 38(7) DMA, is foreseen by the DMA. Investigations of this kind, brought by NCAs, alleviate the Commission of enforcement efforts. Since ultimately, it is the Commission that adopts infringement decisions, this seems to be in line with the harmonisation objective of the DMA. Thus, while the investigative powers might be decentralised, the decision-making is not. In this way, the DMA harnesses the expertise, resources and local market knowledge of NCAs, while preserving uniform interpretation through the Commission’s exclusive decision-making powers. Nonetheless, an active authority such as the AGCM may shape the practical enforcement agenda by selecting which gatekeeper and which conduct to investigate. The AGCM’s recent Apple investigation illustrates this dynamic. Formally, the authority is exercising powers expressly attributed to it by Article 38(7) DMA. Yet the case also demonstrates how NCAs can become influential actors in DMA enforcement, despite the Regulation’s commitment to centralised oversight. As a matter of fact, it was the AGCM’s decision to open the case and to select specific behaviours that it considers in breach of the DMA.
In addition to the prominent role an NCA such as the AGCM can play by means of Article 38(7) DMA, the cases brought by the AGCM against gatekeepers under consumer law and Article 102 TFEU show how this power extends beyond what the DMA itself foresees. In both the Google and Meta cases, the conduct was linked (more or less directly) to DMA obligations. By opening proceedings under national law and Article 102 TFEU, the AGCM can itself accept commitments or find infringements (unless the Commission takes over the case as in Meta). This shows that the AGCM, like other NCAs, is capable of contributing to DMA enforcement through alternative enforcement routes. Furthermore, by selecting particular practices for scrutiny and developing theories of harm around emerging forms of gatekeeper conduct, NCAs can exert pressure on both gatekeepers and the Commission, influencing enforcement priorities and helping to set the broader DMA agenda. Taken together with the Article 38(7) route, it seems that NCAs can carve out quite some space for themselves to bring cases against gatekeepers and shape DMA enforcement, despite the centralisation intention.
Conclusion
The Italian cases illustrate the complexity of the DMA’s enforcement design. While the Regulation is premised on centralised decision-making by the Commission in order to secure uniform and harmonised application across the EU, the AGCM’s recent activity shows that NCAs are far from marginal. Through Article 38(7) investigations, parallel competition law proceedings, and even consumer protection tools, the AGCM is able to engage with conduct that sits at the very heart of DMA obligations, shaping the enforcement agenda in practice. This does not displace the Commission’s ultimate authority to determine non-compliance, but it does suggest a more multi-layered enforcement system than the DMA’s formal structure might imply. As a result, the Italian case study points to an emerging reality in which harmonisation is preserved at the level of final decisions, but increasingly complemented by decentralised investigative and strategic activity at the national level.
This blog is a contribution by Dr. Alessia D’Amico is an Assistant Professor for Competition Law at Utrecht University.
If you do not want to miss any of our future SCiDA blog posts, you can subscribe to the SCiDA-Newsletter here.
